


































this	 area	 coordination	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 arisen	 as	 member	 states	 adjust	 their	 policies	
regarding	citizenship	acquisition	and	 loss	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	European	project.	 Furthermore,	
EU	 citizenship	 grants	 extensive	 rights	 that	 member	 states	 must	 respect,	 though	 the	 only	 way	 to	
become	an	EU	citizen	and	acquire	these	rights	remains	through	citizenship	of	a	member	state.	This	
article	 sketches	 the	 development	 of	 EU	 citizenship	 from	 the	 1950s	 to	 the	 present,	 mapping	 its	
evolution	onto	the	phases	of	European	governance	utilised	in	this	special	issue.	The	search	for	closer	
coordination	and	common	guidelines	concerning	citizenship	flows	from	functional	needs	 inevitably	
generated	by	 superimposing	 a	new	 supranational	 political	 community	over	 existing	national	 ones,	
resulting	 in	 shared	governance	within	 the	 framework	of	member	state	autonomy.	Though	welfare	











Citizenship	 is	 a	 special	 case	 of	 European	 governance	 because	 of	 its	 location	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 state	
sovereignty.	More	than	perhaps	is	true	for	any	other	policy	area,	states	are	reluctant	to	abdicate	or	
transfer	 competence	 over	 the	 attribution	 of	 citizenship,	 because	 the	 competence	 to	 determine	
citizenship	is	the	power	to	decide	who	is	a	member	of	the	polity	(Maas	2013a;	Weber	1964).	It	is	a	
classic	tenet	of	international	relations	that	states	relinquish	sovereignty	to	the	extent	they	abrogate	
or	 infringe	 upon	 their	 power	 to	 determine	 nationality	 (Maas	 2013b).	 Yet	 the	 development	 of	
supranational	 governance	 in	 the	European	Union	 is	 characterised	by	 increased	power	 sharing	and	
coordination	 between	 the	 European	 and	 the	 national	 levels	 (see	 especially	 the	 contributions	 by	
Caviedes,	Guth	and	Tömmel,	this	issue),	and	this	is	true	also	for	citizenship.	Over	time,	coordination	
on	 issues	 of	 citizenship	 acquisition	 and	 loss	 has	 arisen.	 Furthermore,	 European	 Union	 citizenship	
now	grants	extensive	 rights	 that	member	 states	must	 respect,	but	 the	only	way	 to	become	an	EU	
citizen	 and	 acquire	 these	 rights	 remains	 through	 citizenship	 of	 a	 member	 state.	 Policymaking	
regarding	 citizenship	 follows	 the	 general	 pattern	 by	 which	 European	 governance	 evolved	 to	 its	
current	 form	 in	 response	 to	 conflicts	 between	 the	 European	 and	 the	 national	 government	 levels	
(Tömmel	2016),	despite	the	centrality	of	citizenship	to	state	sovereignty.	After	tracing	this	process	
from	 its	 beginnings,	 the	 article	 next	 considers	 the	 constitutionalisation	 of	 EU	 citizenship	 after	 the	
Maastricht	 Treaty,	 focusing	 on	 court	 interpretation	 and	member	 state	 responses.	 The	 article	 next	
analyses	 how	 governance	 in	 a	multilevel	 system	 impacts	 questions	 of	 citizenship	 and	 nationality,	










In	 order	 to	 overcome	 deadlocks,	 European	 policymaking	 continuously	 oscillates	 between	
hierarchical	and	non-hierarchical	modes	of	governance,	often	mixing	the	two,	as	the	Union	strives	to	
create	 the	 procedural	 and	 institutional	 framework	 for	 balancing	 the	 diverging	 policy	 objectives	 of	
the	European	and	the	national	government	levels	and	to	promote	convergence	among	those	of	the	
member	 states	 (Tömmel	 2016).	 The	 evolution	 and	 expansion	 of	 EU	 policymaking	 can	 be	 broken	
down	 into	 four	 phases.	 The	 first,	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 was	 the	 attempt	 to	 implement	 at	 the	
European	 level	 direct	 forms	 of	 hierarchical	 intervention	 based	 on	 the	 traditional	 policy	model	 of	
nation-states.	 Except	 for	 the	 customs	union,	 a	 deregulatory	 exercise	 in	 ‘negative’	 integration,	 this	
failed	 because	 of	 the	 hesitance	 of	 the	 European	 institutions	 to	 exercise	 their	 competences	 fully,	
combined	 with	 strong	 resistance	 from	 the	 member	 states	 against	 intervention	 from	 above.	 The	
relative	 ease	 of	 negative	 integration	 (‘measures	 increasing	 market	 integration	 by	 eliminating	
national	 restraints	 on	 trade	 and	 distortions	 of	 competition’	 (Scharpf	 2010:	 91))	 over	 positive	
integration	 (‘common	 European	 policies	 to	 shape	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 markets	 operate’	
(ibid.))	reflects	a	mode	of	governance	in	which	national	policy	is	severely	restrained	in	its	problem-
solving	 capacity	while	 European	policy	 is	 constrained	by	 the	 lack	of	 intergovernmental	 agreement	
(ibid.).	 In	a	second	phase	beginning	 in	 the	 late	1960s,	 the	Commission	pushed	 for	common	norms	
and	standards	 that	were	 legally	binding,	but	met	enormous	 resistance	 from	national	governments	
and	 ended	 with	 only	 some	 fairly	 rudimentary	 principles	 (Tömmel	 2016).	 In	 the	 1970s	 and	 early	





and	 related	 policy	 areas	 (such	 as	 monetary	 union)	 were	 subject	 to	 clearly	 defined	 rules,	 while	
coordination	of	national	policies	was	 the	preferred	governance	approach	 in	new	policy	areas.	 In	a	
fourth	phase	beginning	 in	 the	mid-1990s,	new	procedures	and	 institutional	arrangements	 (such	as	
the	Open	Method	of	Coordination)	aimed	at	shared	governance,	with	the	member	states	retaining	
their	autonomy.	These	new	governance	approaches	sometimes	even	decentralised	competences	to	





to	 speak	 of	 European	 governance	 of	 citizenship,	 because	 citizenship	 remains	 an	 area	 reserved	 to	
member	state	competence,	unlike	almost	all	other	policy	areas.	Whereas	most	policy	areas	have	at	
least	 some	 European	 dimension,	 decisions	 on	 the	 attribution	 or	 withdrawal	 of	 member	 state	
nationality	at	first	sight	admit	no	role	for	European	governance	because	these	decisions	are	carried	
out	 solely	 by	 the	 member	 states,	 with	 no	 input	 from	 European	 institutions.	 This	 situation	 also	
appeared	unchanged	by	the	 introduction	of	EU	citizenship	 into	the	treaties	at	Maastricht,	because	
the	only	way	to	acquire	EU	citizenship	is	through	citizenship	of	a	member	state,	and	the	Amsterdam	
Treaty	 explicitly	 added	 that	 ‘[c]itizenship	 of	 the	Union	 shall	 complement	 and	not	 replace	 national	
citizenship’.2	Indeed,	 subsequent	 efforts	 to	 give	 EU	 citizenship	 an	 independent	 status	 have	 so	 far	
failed	 to	be	 adopted	 in	 the	 treaties.	 Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 first	 comprehensive	draft	 of	 the	2003	
constitutional	treaty	specified	that	each	EU	citizen	‘enjoys	dual	citizenship,	national	citizenship	and	





the	 larger	 member	 states	 (Maas	 2007:	 85).	 Some	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty’s	 new	
formulation	(replacing	the	Amsterdam	Treaty’s	 ‘complement	and	not	replace’	phrasing	with	a	new	








thus	 covered	 under	 Community	 law	 in	 areas	 of	 Community	 competence.3	This	 meant	 that	 the	
benefits	of	Community	 law	extended	to	 individuals	residing	 in	East	Germany,	but	not	corporations	
and	other	entities	which	would	otherwise	be	considered	legal	persons	(Bleckmann	1978).	Similarly,	
upon	 joining	 the	 Community,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 attached	 a	 declaration	 to	 its	 1972	 Accession	





of	 the	 Treaty	 ratione	 personae’,	 thus	 confirming	 the	 UK’s	 authority	 to	 determine	 by	 itself	 who	




The	 qualification	 that	 member	 states	 could	 lay	 down	 the	 conditions	 for	 acquiring	 or	 losing	
nationality	 only	 while	 ‘having	 due	 regard	 to	 Community	 law’	 appeared	 to	 open	 up	 a	 role	 for	
European	institutions.	Indeed,	during	the	Maastricht	negotiations,	the	European	Parliament	resolved	
that	 the	 ‘Union	may	 establish	 certain	 uniform	 conditions	 governing	 the	 acquisition	 or	 loss	 of	 the	
citizenship	 of	 the	 Member	 States,	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 procedures	 laid	 down	 for	 the	 revision	 of	 the	
Treaty’	 (European	 Parliament	 1991).	 But	 the	member	 states	 did	 not	 take	 up	 this	 idea,	 and	 at	 the	
Edinburgh	Summit	following	the	Maastricht	Treaty	(discussed	below),	the	member	states	attached	a	
declaration	 that	 ‘the	 question	whether	 an	 individual	 possesses	 the	nationality	 of	 a	Member	 State	
shall	 be	 settled	 solely	 by	 reference	 to	 the	nationality	 law	of	 the	Member	 State	 concerned’	 (Maas	
2014a:	415).	
That	 formulation	 disappointed	 those	 who	 had	 been	 hoping	 for	 an	 independent	 status	 for	 EU	




exist	 at	 present,	 will	 take	 the	 first	 step	 towards	 becoming	 a	 reality	 only	 with	 the	
election	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 the	
implementation	of	point	11	concerning	special	rights	








giving	 citizens	 of	 other	 member	 states	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 in	 local	 and	 European	 elections,	 also	
suggested	that	member	states	should	reorganise	their	naturalisation	policies:	‘In	order	to	permit	the	
integration	of	migrants,	[the	European	Parliament]	asks	that	measures	to	assist	the	naturalization	of	
migrants	 who	 opt	 for	 naturalization	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis	 should	 be	 implemented	 by	 national	
legislation’	 (European	 Parliament	 1985:	 467).5	Indeed,	 in	 legal	 circles	 the	 dominant	 view	was	 that	
free	 movement	 legislation	 would	 ultimately	 mean	 concurrent	 jurisdiction	 over	 nationality;	 one	
author	wrote	 that	 ‘the	 free	movement	 of	 persons	 implies	 that	Member	 States	 should	 not	 be	 left	
entirely	free	unilaterally	to	define	their	nationality	for	Community	law	purposes’	(Evans	1991:	190).	
Despite	the	 fact	 that	 the	Micheletti	 case	specified	that	member	states	must	exhibit	 ‘due	regard	to	
Community	 law’	 (Case	 C-369/90	Micheletti	 [1992]	 para	 10)	 in	 their	 policies	 regarding	 citizenship	







in	 the	 treaties,	 the	Court	needed	to	rely	on	other	concepts	such	as	 the	aim	of	promoting	 the	 free	
movement	of	persons;	the	insertion	of	‘citizenship’	meant	the	Court	could	invoke	a	new	and	firmer	
basis	 for	promoting	the	 ‘ever	closer	union	among	the	peoples	of	Europe’	promised	since	the	1957	
Treaty	 and	 the	 ‘broader	 and	 deeper	 community’	 promised	 in	 the	 1951	 Treaty	 (Maas	 2005).	
Following	years	of	inconclusive	efforts	to	translate	lofty	rhetoric	into	concrete	rights	–	from	postwar	
discussions	 of	 common	 citizenship	 through	 proposals	 such	 as	 that	 to	 introduce	 ‘a	 European	
citizenship,	which	would	be	in	addition	to	the	citizenship	which	the	inhabitants	of	our	countries	now	
possess’	 (Italian	 Prime	Minister	 Giulio	 Andreotti	 at	 the	 First	 Summit	 Conference	 of	 the	 Enlarged	
Community	in	October	1972,	discussed	in	Maas	(2007:	31))	–	the	Maastricht	Treaty	finally	achieved	
what	 many	 leaders	 had	 long	 advocated.	 The	 European	 Parliament	 had	 made	 several	
recommendations	 concerning	 citizenship	 in	 its	 1984	Draft	 Treaty	 establishing	 the	 European	Union	
(DTEU),	which	announced	that:	
citizens	of	 the	Member	States	shall	 ipso	 facto	be	citizens	of	 the	Union.	Citizenship	of	
the	 Union	 shall	 be	 dependent	 upon	 citizenship	 of	 a	 Member	 State;	 it	 may	 not	 be	
independently	 acquired	 or	 forfeited.	 Citizens	 of	 the	 Union	 shall	 take	 part	 in	 the	
political	life	of	the	Union	in	the	forms	laid	down	by	the	Treaty,	enjoy	the	rights	granted	
to	them	by	the	legal	system	of	the	Union	and	be	subject	to	its	laws	(DTEU	Article	3)	
but	 this	 idea	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	 1985	 Single	 European	 Act,	 which	 made	 little	 reference	 to	
citizenship.	
The	Maastricht	 Treaty	 declared	 that	 ‘Citizenship	 of	 the	Union	 is	 hereby	 established’,	 that	 ‘[e]very	
person	 holding	 the	 nationality	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 shall	 be	 a	 citizen	 of	 the	 Union’,	 and	 that	 EU	
citizenship	 included	 a	 range	of	 rights:	 the	 right	 to	move	 and	 reside	 freely	within	 EU	 territory,	 the	
right	to	vote	and	to	stand	as	a	candidate	in	municipal	and	European	elections	in	the	member	state	of	
residence,	the	right	to	protection	by	the	diplomatic	or	consular	authorities	of	any	member	state,	the	






textbook	concluded	 that	 ‘Union	citizenship	 is	best	 seen	as	a	 sui	generis	 status	entitling	a	Member	
State	national	to	enjoy,	qua	Union	citizen,	certain	rights	and	obligations	in	certain	areas	covered	by	
the	EC	Treaty’	(Handoll	1995:	310).	Others	suggested	that	EU	citizenship	was	simply	a	‘cynical	public	
relations	exercise’,	 ‘fancy	words	on	a	piece	of	paper’,	 and	 ‘nearly	 exclusively	 a	 symbolic	plaything	
without	 substantive	 content’	 (Guild	 1996:	 30;	 Jessurun	 d’Oliveira	 1995:	 82;	 Weiler	 1998:	 13	
respectively).	 However,	 as	 in	many	 other	 policy	 fields,	 functional	 needs	 over	 time	 place	 limits	 on	
national	 sovereignty;	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 free	 movement	 rights	 at	 the	 core	 of	 EU	 citizenship	 limit	
member	states’	exclusive	competence	over	citizenship	law.	Legal	scholars	now	recognise	that,	if	
there	is	one	lesson	to	be	learnt	from	Union	citizenship,	it	is	that	the	law	develops,	and	





has	 ‘led	 to	 a	 significant	 broadening	 of	 rights	 of	 EU	 citizens,	 and	 resulting	 difficulties	 of	 member	
states	 to	 restrict	 social	 benefits,	 and	 increasingly	 even	 of	 shaping	 their	 national	 citizenship	 law’	
(Schmidt	2011:	20,	21).	
An	 analysis	 based	on	 European	 rights	 is	 necessarily	 formalistic,	 because	 it	 is	 about	 hierarchical	 or	
regulatory	governance:	EU	law	determining	what	member	states	can	and	cannot	do.	Yet	beyond	the	
formal	adaptation	of	member	state	policies	there	is	also	the	‘governance	of	governance’	approach,	
in	which	member	 states	 themselves	adapt	 their	policies,	 influenced	by	developments	at	European	
level.	One	example	of	European	integration	shaping	national	citizenship	is	the	Chen	case.	As	part	of	
the	 Good	 Friday	 Agreement,	 a	 1999	 amendment	 to	 the	 Irish	 constitution	 specified	 that	 Irish	
citizenship	 was	 the	 ‘birthright	 of	 every	 person	 born	 in	 the	 island	 of	 Ireland’,	 including	 Northern	
Ireland.6	Following	legal	advice	and	seeking	to	evade	China’s	‘one-child	policy’,	Man	Lavette	Chen,	a	
wealthy	Chinese	businesswoman	working	 in	 the	UK	 for	a	 firm	owned	by	her	husband,	 travelled	 to	





requires	 the	acquisition	of	Community	nationality	 in	order	 to	allow	him	 to	enjoy	 the	
rights	 associated	with	 that	 status,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 right	 of	 establishment	 under	
Article	 18	 EC,	 there	 is	 nothing	 ‘abusive’	 about	 taking	 action,	 in	 compliance	with	 the	
law,	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 child,	 when	 born,	 satisfies	 the	 conditions	 for	 acquiring	 the	







The	 Chen	 case	 was	 still	 undecided	 when	 the	 Irish	 government	 proposed	 the	 Twenty-Seventh	
Amendment	of	the	Constitution	of	Ireland	in	March	2004	to	remedy	what	the	Justice	Minister	called	
an	‘abuse	of	citizenship,	by	which	it	is	conferred	on	persons	with	no	tangible	link	to	the	nation	or	the	





Irish	citizen,	 the	person	 is	also	an	EU	citizen	with	all	 the	rights	of	 free	movement	and	other	treaty	
rights	 that	 go	with	 that	 status’.7	The	 amendment	 proposed	 to	 specify	 that	 a	 baby	 born	 in	 Ireland	
‘who	does	not	have,	at	the	time	of	the	birth	of	that	person,	at	least	one	parent	who	is	an	Irish	citizen	









another	 Member	 State	 by	 imposing	 an	 additional	 condition	 for	 recognition	 of	 that	
nationality	with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 exercise	of	 the	 fundamental	 freedoms	provided	 for	 in	
the	Treaty	(Case	C-200/02	Zhu	and	Chen	[2004]	para	37).10		






citizenship	 rights	on	 residence	 rather	 than	nationality.	 These	 functional	 needs	 are	 independent	of	
any	appeal	to	the	‘European	idea’;	instead,	they	reflect	coordination	difficulties	inevitably	generated	
by	superimposing	a	new	supranational	political	community	over	existing	national	ones.11	There	has	
been	 sporadic	 political	 support	 for	 increasing	 the	 role	 of	 EU	 institutions	 in	 the	 governance	 of	
citizenship.	 For	 example,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 even	 before	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty	 was	 passed,	 the	
European	 Parliament	 passed	 a	 resolution	 stating	 that	 ‘[t]he	 Union	may	 establish	 certain	 uniform	
conditions	governing	the	acquisition	or	loss	of	the	citizenship	of	the	Member	States,	by	virtue	of	the	







select	officeholders,	 for	example	through	the	right	to	vote)	and	actively	 (participating	 in	governing	
by	running	for	or	actually	serving	in	political	office).	Since	the	introduction	of	EU	citizenship	into	the	
treaties	 at	Maastricht,	 EU	 citizens	 have	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 and	 run	 for	 office	 at	 the	municipal	 and	
European	 level	 regardless	 of	 their	 state	 of	 residence.	 This	 motivated	 several	 member	 states	 to	
change	 their	 legislation	 regarding	 elections.	 In	 France,	 for	 example,	 the	 introduction	 of	 EU	
citizenship	prompted	several	changes	to	the	constitution	to	permit	voting	by	EU	citizens	who	were	
not	 citizens	of	 France,	 and	voting	 rights	proved	 contentious.	Alain	 Juppé,	 secretary	 general	of	 the	
Gaullist	 RPR	 party	 (later	 foreign	minister,	 then	 Prime	Minister)	 said	 it	was	 ‘completely	 out	 of	 the	
question	to	give	foreigners	the	possibility	of	having	municipal	councillors,	who	could	then	endorse	a	






its	 own	 nationals;	 thus,	 France	 does	 not	 permit	mayors	who	 are	 not	 citizens	 of	 France,	 although	
several	 other	 member	 states	 do	 (European	 Council	 1994).	 The	 Commission	 works	 ‘in	 close	




For	municipal	 and	 European	 elections,	 there	 are	 thus	 clear	 European	 rules,	which	member	 states	
must	apply	equally	to	all	EU	citizens,	without	distinction	between	their	 ‘own’	citizens	and	those	of	





(European	 Commission	 2014a).	 While	 it	 is	 for	 member	 states	 alone	 to	 decide	 on	 their	 internal	
electoral	rules,	the	Commission	notes	that	 ‘national	policies	which	lead	to	disenfranchising	citizens	
may	be	considered	as	limiting	the	enjoyment	of	rights	attached	to	EU	citizenship,	such	as	the	right	to	
move	 and	 reside	 freely	 within	 the	 EU’,	 and	 comes	 with	 several	 proposals	 to	 address	 such	
disenfranchisement,	 including	enfranchisement	 in	the	country	of	residence	(ibid).	This	kind	of	 ‘soft	
harmonisation’	does	not	 constitute	 specifically	 top-down	governance	 (because	EU	 institutions	 lack	
jurisdiction	 in	 this	 area)	 but	 it	 does	 reflect	 pressures	 for	 increased	 coordination	 in	 an	 area	 key	 to	











citizens	 on	 the	 same	 conditions	 as	 their	 own	 nationals	 (European	 Council	 2015).	 Yet	 the	
transposition	 will	 likely	 face	 several	 barriers,	 including	 the	 proliferation	 of	 agreements	 between	




for	 the	 relationship	 (and	 the	 reputational	 image)	of	a	State	vis-à-vis	 its	 citizens’	 (Wouters,	Duquet	
and	Meuwissen	2014:	576),	yet	 ‘the	specific	content	of	the	‘right	to	consular	protection’	 is	unclear	
and	results	in	a	diverging	and	ad	hoc	implementation	of	this	Union	citizens’	right	by	Member	States’	
(ibid.).	 The	 political	 dynamic	 appears	 to	 be	 one	 in	 which	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 European	
Parliament	 favour	 a	 more	 prominent	 role	 for	 EU	 actors,	 while	 most	 member	 states	 and	 the	







emphasis	 is	on	horizontal	 rather	 than	vertical	 transfer	of	 competence:	 from	one	member	 state	 to	





to	 the	 government	 of	 Malta’s	 announcement	 that	 it	 would	 give	 citizenship	 to	 non-citizens	 who	
donated	money	 to	Malta.14	This	was	 far	 from	 the	 first	 investor	 citizenship	 scheme	within	 the	 EU.	
Similar	schemes	in	France,	the	Netherlands,	and	the	UK	required	a	‘genuine	link’	(demonstrated	by	
periods	of	residence)	before	naturalisation,	but	those	in	Austria,	Bulgaria,	Cyprus	and	Ireland	had	no	
residence	 requirement.15	The	 original	 Maltese	 plan	 also	 had	 no	 residence	 requirement,	 and	 the	
concession	 to	market	Maltese	 citizenship	 was	 put	 to	 tender	 and	 awarded	 to	 a	 private	 company,	
Henley	 &	 Partners	 (‘The	 Global	 Leaders	 in	 Residence	 and	 Citizenship	 Planning’	 16 ),	 under	 the	
supervision	of	a	new	government	agency,	 Identity	Malta	(Malta	2013).	The	plan	was	controversial,	
domestically	 (the	opposition	party	proposed	 significant	 amendments,	 though	 it	 had	 itself	 initiated	
the	 process	 when	 in	 government),	 amongst	 the	 academic	 community	 (most	 contributors	 to	 a	
scholarly	symposium	on	selling	citizenship	(Shachar	and	Bauböck	2014)	focused	on	negative	aspects	
of	such	sales),	and	at	the	European	level.	
EU	 Justice	 Commissioner,	 Viviane	Reding,	 blasted	 the	 programme	 in	 January	 2014,	 preceding	 and	
during	a	debate	 in	 the	European	Parliament,	 saying	 that	 ‘Citizenship	must	not	be	up	 for	 sale’;	 she	
added	that	
Member	 States	 should	 use	 their	 prerogatives	 to	 award	 citizenship	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	
sincere	cooperation	with	the	other	Member	States,	as	stipulated	by	the	EU	Treaties.	In	
compliance	 with	 the	 criterion	 used	 under	 public	 international	 law,	 Member	 States	
should	 only	 award	 citizenship	 to	 persons	where	 there	 is	 a	 ‘genuine	 link’	 or	 ‘genuine	
connection’	 to	 the	 country	 in	 question	 (European	 Parliament	 2014a:	 intervention	 by	
Viviane	Reding).	
The	 next	 day,	 the	 European	 Parliament	 resolution	 specified	 that	 ‘outright	 sale	 of	 EU	 citizenship	
undermines	 the	 mutual	 trust	 upon	 which	 the	 Union	 is	 built’;	 Parliament	 acknowledged	 that	
citizenship	 remains	 for	member	states	 to	decide	but	called	on	member	states	 ‘to	be	careful	when	
exercising	their	competences	 in	this	area	and	to	take	possible	side-effects	 into	account’	 (European	
Parliament	 2014b).	 The	 resolution	 further	 asked	 the	 Commission	 to	 assess	 citizenship	 schemes	 in	





depends	 on	 member	 state	 citizenship,	 ‘it	 also	 has	 an	 autonomous	 character	 stemming	 from	 the	
character	of	the	European	legal	order.	This	means	that	the	competence	of	Member	States	to	enact	




Two	 weeks	 after	 the	 EP	 debate	 and	 resolution,	 representatives	 of	 Malta	 met	 with	 Commission	
officials	 and	 announced	 revisions	 to	 the	 programme	 (Dali	 2014).	 The	 press	 release	 about	 the	




Commission,	 concluding	 that	 the	 Commission	 ‘welcomed	 the	 announced	 amendments	 concerning	
the	 residence	 requirement	 –	 done	 in	 good	 faith	 and	 in	 a	 spirit	 of	 sincere	 cooperation	 and	 both	
parties	express	satisfaction	about	 the	understanding	reached	on	this	 issue’	 (European	Commission	
2014b).	The	meeting	 is	presented	as	a	unilateral	discussion,	with	 the	Commission	simply	 receiving	
information	 from	Malta.	Malta’s	 Prime	Minister	 crowed	 that	 it	 was	made	 amply	 clear	 during	 the	
meeting	that	‘citizenship	was	a	competent	matter	of	the	member	state’	and	called	on	the	leader	of	
the	opposition	 to	withdraw	 the	 judicial	protest	and	 the	motion	 tabled	 in	parliament	 to	 repeal	 the	
investor	scheme.17	
The	Commission’s	 follow-up	 report	concluded	 that	 ‘naturalisation	decisions	 taken	by	one	Member	
State	 are	 not	 neutral	 with	 regard	 to	 other	 Member	 States	 and	 to	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 whole’	 and	 that	
‘Member	States	should,	when	awarding	citizenship,	ensure	that	there	is	a	‘genuine	link’	or	‘genuine	
connection’	 between	 the	 applicant	 and	 the	 country	 or	 its	 citizens’	 (European	Commission	 2014c).	
Some	argue	that	this	idea	means	that	European	and	international	legal	principles	are	‘transcending	
the	national	 realms	of	 competence	and	affecting	nation-states’	discretionary	power	 in	 the	 field	of	
citizenship’	(Carrera	2014:	408).	To	the	extent	this	is	true,	EU	citizenship	will	indeed	start	to	displace	
member	 state	 citizenship	 as	 the	 ‘fundamental	 status’	 of	 nationals	 of	 the	 member	 states,	 as	
discussed	 in	 the	 section	on	 ‘ever	 closer	union’	below.	Curiously,	however,	no	other	member	 state	
that	was	already	doing	what	Malta	was	simply	planning	to	do	–	selling	citizenship	without	requiring	
residence	 –	 has	 (as	 of	 this	 writing)	 had	 its	 investor	 citizenship	 regime	 investigated	 by	 the	
Commission.	 Although	 the	 Commission	 noted	 that	 it	 was	 ‘analysing	 Investor	 schemes	 in	 other	
Member	States	 in	order	to	see	 if	any	 further	action	 is	 required’	 (European	Commission	2014c),	no	
further	 action	 has	 yet	 been	 taken,	 despite	 the	 persistence	 in	 several	 member	 states	 of	 investor	
citizenship	schemes	similar	to	that	first	proposed	by	Malta.	Thus,	one	interpretation	of	the	case	of	
Malta,	 the	EU’s	smallest	member	state	and	hence	possibly	a	 relatively	easy	 target	 for	Commission	
attention,	 is	that	naturalisation	policies	remain	within	the	 legal	competence	of	each	member	state	
acting	 autonomously,	 despite	 the	 Commission’s	 admonishment	 that	 ‘Member	 States	 should	 use	





stripped	 of	 their	 previous	 nationality)	 as	 a	 central	 element	 of	 nationality	 law.	 But	 here,	 too,	
European	 integration	has	 created	 situations	 in	which	member	 state	nationality	 law	must	 adapt	 to	
the	growth	of	EU	citizenship.	One	paradigmatic	example	 is	the	Rottman	case,	 in	which	an	Austrian	
citizen	who	was	charged	with	financial	crime	fled	to	Germany	and	was	naturalised.	By	becoming	a	
German	 citizen,	 he	 lost	 his	 Austrian	 citizenship	 under	 Austrian	 nationality	 law.	 When	 Austrian	
authorities	later	asked	Germany	to	extradite	Mr	Rottmann,	German	authorities	decided	that	he	had	
obtained	German	citizenship	fraudulently	and	moved	to	revoke	his	German	citizenship.	But	doing	so	
could	 render	 him	 stateless,	 and	 thus	 also	 result	 in	 loss	 of	 EU	 citizenship	 (which	 had	 originally	
provided	 him	 the	 right	 to	 reside	 in	 Germany).	 The	 Advocate	 General’s	 opinion	 noted	 that	 EU	
citizenship	 is	 a	 ‘legal	 and	political	 status	 conferred	on	 the	 nationals	 of	 a	 State	 beyond	 their	 State	
body	politic’	 in	which	EU	citizenship	 is	 ‘a	citizenship	beyond	the	State’;	 it	 is	based	on	the	member	
states’	‘mutual	commitment	to	open	their	respective	bodies	politic	to	other	European	citizens	and	to	
construct	 a	 new	 form	of	 civic	 and	 political	 allegiance	 on	 a	 European	 scale’	 (Case	 C-135/08	 [2010]	
Rottmann,	Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Poiares	Maduro,	30	September	2009,	paras	16,	23).	Thus,	
although	decisions	about	 the	acquisition	or	 loss	of	member	 state	 (and	 thereby	EU)	 citizenship	are	





para	 23).	 The	 judgment	 concluded	 that	 it	 is	 not	 contrary	 to	 EU	 law	 for	 a	 member	 state	 to	
denaturalise	its	citizen	‘when	that	nationality	has	been	obtained	by	deception,	on	condition	that	the	
decision	 to	 withdraw	 observes	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality’	 (Case	 C-135/08	 Rottmann	 [2010]	
para	59).	 The	 idea	 that	member	 state	nationality	 law	must	be	 compatible	with	EU	citizenship	and	
respect	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 EU	 citizen	 leads	 in	 the	 judgment	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that,	 for	 EU	 citizens,	
member	state	decisions	about	naturalisation	and	denaturalisation	are	 ‘amenable	to	 judicial	 review	
carried	out	in	the	light	of	European	Union	law’	(ibid,	para	48).18		
Quite	 clearly,	 then,	 the	 Rottmann	 case	 places	 limits	 on	 member	 state	 autonomy	 in	 the	 field	 of	
citizenship	(Kochenov	2010a;	Shaw	2011),	as	do	subsequent	cases	such	as	Ruiz	Zambrano,	McCarthy	
and	 Dereci.	 The	 European	 Parliament	 resolved	 in	 2014	 that,	 while	 naturalisation	 and	
denaturalisation	decisions	are	regulated	by	member	state	law,	there	should	be	‘closer	coordination	
and	 a	more	 structured	 exchange	 of	 best	 practices	 between	Member	 States	 with	 respect	 to	 their	
citizenship	 laws	 in	order	 to	ensure	 fundamental	 rights	and	particularly	 legal	 certainty	 for	 citizens’,	
and	also	called	for	‘comprehensive	common	guidelines	clarifying	the	relation	between	national	and	
European	citizenship’	 (European	Parliament	2014c).	Though	not	 forced	by	any	EU	 law	to	 take	 into	
account	EU	citizenship	status	in	their	general	naturalisation	and	denaturalisation	policies,	increasing	
numbers	of	member	states	do	distinguish	between	EU	citizens	and	citizens	of	third	countries	–	for	
example	 concerning	 the	 length	 of	 residence	 periods	 required	 before	 naturalisation,	 even	 though	
naturalisation	is	far	less	important	for	citizens	of	other	member	states	(because	they	already	enjoy	
almost	all	the	same	rights	as	domestic	citizens)	than	citizens	of	third	countries	(Kochenov	2010b:	3).	
This	 fits	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 discrimination	 between	 citizens	 of	 member	 states	 and	 those	 of	 third	
countries	 has	 developed	 gradually	 over	 time:	 the	 strict	 separation	 between	 EU	 citizens	 and	 third	
country	 nationals	 observable	 today	 is	 at	 least	 partly	 judge-made	 (Maas	 2008;	 Kochenov	 2016).	
Member	 state	autonomy	can	 thus	be	 limited	by	 the	general	principles	of	 EU	 law	even	 in	 areas	of	




In	 the	historical	development	of	nation-states,	 the	 introduction	of	central	 rights	 that	 took	primacy	
over	 local	 ones	 empowered	 individuals	 and	 redrew	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 governments	 of	
the	centre	and	those	of	the	units.	Similarly,	EU	citizenship	limits	the	power	of	member	states	to	treat	
their	 own	 nationals	 worse	 than	 nationals	 of	 other	 member	 states,	 and	 most	 of	 the	 recent	 free	
movement	of	persons	and	explicitly	citizenship	cases	at	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	










naturalisation	 and	 denaturalisation	 policies	 are	 compatible	 with	 EU	 citizenship,	 member	 states	
remain	 free	 to	 determine	 the	 particularities	 of	 their	 citizenship	 and	 nationality	 policies	 –	 a	 wide	
scope	 of	 action	 for	 member	 states	 that	 the	 European	 Court	 will	 likely	 continue	 to	 safeguard	 in	





fitting	with	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘governance	 of	 governance’	 explored	 in	 this	 special	 issue;	 instead	 of	 top-
down	 policymaking,	 governance	 is	 shared	 across	 multiple	 levels,	 with	 the	 European	 level	 mostly	
involved	in	developing	guidelines	or	norms	to	which	the	member	states	generally	conform	(Caviedes	
and	Maas,	this	issue).	This	type	of	dynamic	can	be	identified	in	the	way	in	which	the	naturalisation	
laws	 of	 the	member	 states	 seem	 to	 have	 converged	 so	 that	 the	 length	 of	 residence	 required	 for	
naturalisation	 is	quite	close	 in	all	 the	member	states.	Similarly,	 the	Long-Term	Residence	Directive	
(European	Council	2003)	has	ensured	that	third-country	nationals	enjoy	permanent	rights	after	five	




of	migrants	 has	 in	 fact	 been	 implemented	 in	most	member	 states	 –	 though	 this	 implementation	






EU	 citizenship	 is	 far	 from	 finished.	 The	extension	of	 rights	has	been	bumpy	and	disjointed	but,	 to	
date,	there	have	never	been	reversals	in	the	extension	of	rights	to	free	movement,	as	would	be	the	
case	 if	 a	 certain	 category	of	 citizens	 gained	 free	movement	 rights	 but	 later	 lost	 them.	Rights	 that	
could	be	extended	further	 include	cross-border	recognition	for	same-sex	couples,	 to	ensure	 family	
relationships	 recognised	 in	 one	member	 state	 are	 accorded	 equal	 treatment	 across	 the	 EU.	More	
important	than	the	expansion	of	rights	is	ensuring	they	are	respected;	the	existence	of	a	legal	right	
does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 individuals	 can	 exercise	 that	 right	 effectively.	 Even	 today	 there	 is	
significant	discrimination	against	 the	 least	well-off	 EU	citizens,	 those	who	are	perceived	 to	pose	a	
threat	 to	 or	 constitute	 a	 burden	 on	 the	 host	member	 state.	 Such	 forms	 of	 discrimination	 against	
‘undesirable’	 migrants	 commonly	 occur	 in	 jurisdictions	 where	 different	 levels	 of	 government	 are	
responsible	 for	 social	 welfare	 provision,	 and	 the	 EU	 is	 no	 exception	 (Maas	 2013c).	 British	 Prime	




One	 driver	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 free	 movement	 by	 governments	 such	 as	 those	 of	 Austria,	
Germany,	the	Netherlands,	and	the	UK	flows	from	the	fact	that	a	common	European	citizenship	has	




to	 national	 welfare	 systems	 (Blauberger	 and	 Schmidt	 2014).	 Indeed,	 Directive	 2004/38,	 which	
codifies	European	jurisprudence	on	free	movement,	states	in	its	preamble,	that	‘Union	citizenship	is	
the	 fundamental	 status	 of	 nationals	 of	 the	member	 states	 when	 they	 exercise	 their	 right	 of	 free	








from	 the	 protections	 of	 EU	 citizenship	 often	 do	 not	 receive	 any	 significant	 protection,	 as	 the	




In	 the	 final	analysis,	 the	most	 significant	 right	of	EU	citizenship	 remains	 the	 right	 to	 live	and	work	
anywhere	within	the	common	territory	–	a	right	that	goes	much	deeper	than	the	Schengen	system	
of	border	checks	or	even	 the	 insertion	of	 the	 term	 ‘citizenship’	 into	 the	EU	 treaties	at	Maastricht,	
because	it	is	grounded	in	the	principles	of	equality	and	non-discrimination	on	the	basis	of	nationality	
that	 were	 agreed	 in	 the	 Paris	 and	 Rome	 Treaties	 in	 the	 1950s.	 Gradually	 expanding	 from	 these	
origins,	 free	 movement	 today	 continues	 to	 epitomise	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 Europeans	 (Recchi	
2015).	 Yet	 perhaps	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 European	 ‘governance	 of	 governance’	 in	 the	 field	 of	
citizenship	 should	move	 beyond	 a	 formalistic,	 rights-based	 approach	 towards	 a	more	 sociological	
approach	 that	 views	 citizenship	 as	 a	mode	 of	 being	 in	 society	with	 others;	 despite	 its	 strict	 legal	




literature	 (Schmidt	 2014),	 and	Europeanization	 can	be	 seen	not	only	 regarding	 EU	 law	but	 also	 in	
terms	of	international	norms	(Džankić,	Kacarska,	Pantić	and	Shaw	2015).	Despite	the	importance	of	








The	 goal	 of	 creating	 European	 citizens	 has	 arguably	 always	 been	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	
European	project	(Maas	2014b).	Yet	throughout	the	long	evolution	of	EU	citizenship,	member	states	
have	steadfastly	refused	to	accede	to	pressures	–	from	the	European	Parliament,	Commission,	and	
sometimes	 the	 Court	 –	 to	 harmonise	 or	 communitarise	 citizenship	 legislation,	 and	 the	 treaties	
specify	that	policies	regarding	the	acquisition	and	loss	of	nationality	remain	the	sole	competence	of	
the	 member	 states.	 Yet	 as	 the	 range	 of	 examples	 discussed	 in	 this	 article	 illustrate,	 there	 is	
nevertheless	 an	 emerging	 European	 governance	 even	 in	 this	 area	 so	 central	 to	 state	 sovereignty.	
European	governance	of	citizenship	at	first	sight	seems	impossible	because,	unlike	almost	all	other	
policy	 areas,	 citizenship	 remains	 reserved	 to	 exclusive	member	 state	 competence.	 But	 functional	
needs	 driven	 by	 free	 movement	 of	 individuals	 are	 coupled	 with	 the	 growing	 realisation	 that	 EU	
citizenship	 creates	 a	 new	 political	 sphere	 that	 is	 ‘above’	 that	 of	 the	 member	 states	 and	 whose	
subjects,	 EU	citizens,	have	 rights	and	a	 status	 that	 similarly	 transcends	 the	member	 states.	 In	 this	
sense,	Europe	is	the	home	of	the	most	advanced	form	of	multilevel	citizenship	 in	the	world	today,	
anticipating	 possibly	 similar	 developments	 in	 other	 venues	 of	 regional	 integration	 (Maas	 2013b;	
Maas	2015;	Schönberger	2005).	
The	emergence	of	European	governance	of	citizenship	would	not	be	surprising	to	early	 integration	
theorists	 such	 as	 Deutsch	 (1957:	 53-54),	 who	 argued	 that	 ‘[f]ull-scale	 mobility	 of	 persons	 has	
followed	every	successful	amalgamated	security-community	 in	modern	times	 immediately	upon	its	











governance	 with	 the	 member	 states	 retaining	 their	 autonomy.	 As	 the	 examples	 above	 illustrate,	
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2	This	 phrasing	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 1992	 Edinburgh	 Summit	 declaration	 following	 Denmark’s	 initial	 rejection	 of	 the	
Maastricht	Treaty,	discussed	in	Maas	(2007:	53).	
3	Declaration	of	the	Government	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	on	the	definition	of	the	expression	‘German	national’.	

















																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
12	See,	 for	 example,	 COM(2012)	 99,	 On	 the	 application	 of	 Directive	 94/80/EC	 on	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 and	 to	 stand	 as	 a	
candidate	in	municipal	elections	by	citizens	of	the	Union	residing	in	a	Member	State	of	which	they	are	not	nationals.	
13 	See,	 for	 example,	 COM(2014)	 196,	 Towards	 more	 democratic	 European	 Parliament	 elections.	 Report	 on	 the	





15	The	 idea	of	a	 ‘genuine	 link’	was	enunciated	 in	 the	Nottebohm	 case,	which	remains	controversial.	See	Audrey	Macklin,	













of	belonging	and	 loyalty,	 citizenship	 in	 this	wider	anthropological/sociological	 sense	means	 that	 the	 rights	and	duties	of	
citizenship	do	not	emanate	from	a	transcendent	power	(the	state)	but	from	social	conventions	based	on	social	relations.	
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